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IT has become popular to discuss the recent history
of fanm income and debt in the context of a 1973—80
boom pen-iod and a post-1980 collapse in the fitrnm
sector’s per-forniance. i’his view suggests that the pen’-
fon’nmance of thme fannmi sectom’ sinmce 1980 represents a
shan’p break with historicah experience.
This an’ticle reviews the evidence used by sonne
analysts to an-gue that time farnm sector’s doivntutn is a
recent phenonmenon. ht timenm analyzes alter-native indi-
cators more represenmtative of the farnmm sector’s ceo—
nonmic health arid concludes that the 1980s an’e little
more than the continuation of a long-establishmed
downward trend.
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The perfon-mance of U.S. agriculture in the 1970s
genen-aihy is chmar’acten’ized as a boom period onm the
basis of two inmdicaton’s: expon’t volume and asset val-
ues. As the indexes plotted in chart 1 shmow, expon-ts
and asset values rose r-apidly throughm 1980; both se—
des, however, imave fahienm precipitouslY sinmce therm.
The 36 percent increase in U.S. fan’m export volunme
betweeim 1973 and 1980 was the conmbinmed n’esult of
nmanmy coincidenmt changes: pn-oduction sbmon’tfalls in
otlmen grain—producing countries, the fall in time
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dohlan s ncal cxchange ialuc (following thme switch to
floating txchange rates) naptd growth nn real foreign
nncomcs and stn ong tnmccntnves from domustnc corn
modity prognanms fon US farmers to cxp md output
Over the samu pci-nod a r nsing U S nnflatnon n Ut. tax
advantagus nssocnatc d with owricnship of farmland
and the nnccnmtwes of commodity programs to cxpand
production increased the demand Ion farm assets,
pn’inmiarily hanmt. ‘time n’esult was a 46 percenmt inmcn ease mm
thereal valueof fan’nmi assets. Thus, the sinai-p increases
in these two indicators presumably signalled that the
markets for U.S. farm products wene growinmg arid that
ownen’s of assets employed in farnm production wen’e
becoming wealthier.
tnmtc n pretnng these nndic ators bn oadly as nrn astmn es of
economic well-being supports the current notion that
the fat-ni sector’s collapse began in 1981. Mon-coven-,
their’ pan’ahiel declines since then have been viewed as
more than coinmcidence. With n’eai fan-m expor-ts fallinmg
46 pen-cent and neal asset values fallinmg 35 pen’cenmt
between 1980 anmd 1985, a causal cimain seems clear: the
loss of expon’t nmarkets abnoad causes adecline in farnm
incomes, which, in turn, causes declines in asset val-
ues and defaults onm fan-nm debt. Given this view ofwlmenm
anmd why the farm secton-’s pn-obhems on’iginated, the
apparent solution to the problem is to stimulate cx—
ponts.This ititent is expressed clean-I in the 1985 Farnm
Bill and the discretionmany implementation of its provi-
sions by the Secretany of Agriculture. With gn-eater
fon-eign sales, presumably, fan-nm inmconme, pn-ices and
asset values all will n’ise.
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Real Farm Assets and Real Farm Exports
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There are at least two pitfalls to using export volume
and asset values as prinnany indicators of the fan’m
sector’s economic health. First, sehlinmg larger quanti-
ties ofoutput to foreign buyer-s says notlmingabout the
profitability offarming. Export volunme is solely a mea-
sure of quantity; it may bear-little predictable n-elation-
ship to thenet n-cturns can-ned by the labor and capital
employed in farming. t’he export measure pn-ovides no
information about the costs of producinmg far-nm prod-
ucts relative to pr-ices received by farmers.
Second, the appneciationm of farnmland pi’ices during
the 1970s masked the incipient seven-c finmanmcial prob-
1cm now facinmg farnmen’s. Farmen-s wen-e earning a nt-la—
tively low return lnom fan-ming itself; their clmiefgains
accn-ued from the capital appn-eciationm of fan-nmhand
n’esn.nlting from under—anticipated inflation. Farmer-s
who bon-rowed agairmst their- higher-valued land were
borrowing againmst gains in wealth that were nmot re-
lated to the income associated witim farnminmg. This
tinancial strate~’could he pursued only so long as
asset values continued to nise fast enough to support
the higher- debt load they acquired.
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A considerably differermt pictun-e of the fanm sector’s
performance canm be discerned fn-onm exanmmining pat—
teins in time i-elevant price, pn-oductivity anmd income
data-
This alternative longer--run history of the farnm sec-
tor- begins with the n-elationships shmown Sm figure 1 anmd
ctiant 2. F’igure I depicts total product (Parmc’l (a) and
marginmai pn-oduct (Panmel (b~curves and illustrates a

















returns. Total product is time total amount of output
that caim be pn’ocluced fn’ormm any par-ticular quantity of
inprtts (land, laimor-, capital anmd other n-esoun’cest used
irm production. Margirmal product represents the
change in total pr-oduct that nt-suIts fronm a cha’nge mm
the quantity of one input, holding time quanmtities of
otlmei inmpints constant. 1’lme lawof dimninmishitmg nttunris
says Ilmat, at some poumt, time additional output gained
fn’om an extn’a unit of one input man’gina( product( will
begin to declirme. Moreover, beyonmd sonmme poinmt, add-
ing nmmor-e urmits of an input n-educes total pi-oduct; time
man-ginal product of this irmput is nmow rmegative. Timese
n-elationslmips are discussed extensively irm nmmanv nmmi-
cr’oecononmmics textbooks; thus, it is sufficient for (:ur—
rent purposes sinnply to assert that, wimerm rmmore of army
one nnpn.nt is added, while lmoldmnmg time quantities of
other irmpii ts constant, total output rises first at an
inmcr-easing n-ate (betweenm poirmts A and Bt, then r-ises at
a decn’easing n-ate (between points B and C) and, finmally,
declinmes tto tIme r-iglmt of point CI.’






Looking at Panel (hI of the figure, it is clear that we
canm observe gneater’ pnocluctivity mm the pn-octuctionm of
some commodity as a result of two very diffen-ent
causes. On the onme hand, it is possible to move fr’om
point (1) to point (2) on curve Mi’,: a reduction in time
quantity of a specific input ennployed is associated
witim a nmovemnenmt back alormg time Mi’ curve.. Time mar—
ginal pnoduct of the specific inmput r-ennaining in the
industry will be higher- than before, although total
product is lower-. A second alternative is that sonmme
technological improvemenmt slmifts time entin-e Mt’ curve
to sonmetlminng like MP~ thus, the nmiarginal product for
any quantity of input is gn’eater umiden the rmew tech-
nolo~’(MPJ than unden the old )Mi’,).
There is, of coun-se, a substantial diffen-ence betweenm
the two cases. The fin-st case n-esults fn-onm certairm in-
puts leaving time industry; the seconmd case resinlts in
additional inputs etmterirmg the industry.’ The data for-
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‘The MPcurve, multiplied by the price of the final good produced by
this and other inputs, is the demand curve for the input. An outward
shift in the MP (or VMP) curve,therefore, reflects an increase in the
demand forthat input.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OFST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1~N ~
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the farm secton, shown in chart 2, indicate timat agri-
culture’s pn’oductivity gains have been associated witim
reduced numnbers of farmers. Stantmnmg frorn common
inctex bases of 100 in 1950, the chart shows that on.ntput
per far-mworker has increased over 00 pen’cent while
the numbei- of fan-nm won*ers has declined about 70
percent. The data appeal- to be conmsislent witim an
upwan’d mnovennent alormg a curve sucim as Mi’, r’ather
than an outwan’ct shift in factor productivity such as
MR. The coincident olmservation of both gr-eater- pr-o—
ductivity and fewer- far-nmer-s suggests that agnicultun-e
is rmow a decliimirmg industty anmd, nmmoreovel-, imas tmeerm
so for’ sever-al decades.
All things equal, more output per unmit of input helps
tar-men-s as it would allow them to sell mon-c product
from the sanme amount of effort devoted to farnming.
But, all things ane not equal. A cimange in jmr-ices of far-rn
pr’oducts also affects time well-being of farnmers. Total
revermue (‘I’ll) received by flu-timers is defined as price (P1
times quanmtity sold (Q). We already have seen timat
productivity and total output have inmcn-eased signmmfi-
cantty in farnming. The daslmed gn-eenm tine plotted in
chart 3 shows, imoweven-, ttmat greater pr-oductivity (in
conjunction with otherfactons, sucim as slow gn’owth in
food denmand) imas nt-suited mm lower prices of fan-nmm
pr’oducts n-dative to pm-ices ofnonfan-m pnodsncts. Witlm
output r-isinmg anmd prices failing, wimat will imappen to
tIme weli—Imeing of fan’nmc-rs?
The result lmas to do with the elasticity of demand
for farm pi-oducts. For pun-poses of caicuiating the
effect of cimanging prices on far-nm rt-venues, rmmost stud-
ies estinnate the price elasticity of food denmand to he
near —0.2! tfwe assurmme, for easeof graplmical illustra-
‘See, tom example, King (1979), for areview of food dethand studies.
The income elasticity typically is estimated to be near 0.2, which
suggests that tood demand will increase slowly, relative to general
economic growth, and instead will depend more on the growth of
population than otherfactors.
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tiomi (figure 2), tlmat time demand curve for fat-nm pr’od-
uctsis linear, it can be demonstr-ated that time nmar’ginai
r’evermue curve for sates of farm proctucts also will be
tmnear’ anmd inter-cept the lmonizormtal axis at exactly one-
half ttme distance between time or-igin and the point
wimer-e the demand curve totictmes time horizontal axis.’
it also is well knmownm timat a pr-ice elasticity of demand
equal to —0.2 is on the lower portion of the denmmanmd
curve and is associated witlm rlegative nmmargmimai new—
nue. Tlmat is, a given pei-centage change mm output will
cause a larger percentage cimanmge in pn’ice mm time oppo-
site direction; consequenmtly, total revenue (P X QI will
fall witim greater farnmm productivity. tJnmiess time costs of
farrmm proctuction an-c faliinmg faster timan the pr-ices of
farm pn’oducts (and time relative price line mm chant 3
suggests time opposite), time end n-esult will be iowen-
real farm irmconme.
‘For proofs of this proposition, see Stiglem, pp. 55—57 or King, pp.
540—41.
And, in fact, the solid black line in cimart 3 shows timat
real farm inmcome imas heen onm a steady downward
tnt-nd for- mnany years. Heal rmet far-mn inmcorne mm 1985
was less timan one-halfof its value in 1950. Over time last
10 years, real net fan-ni income has averaged $29.3
billion (mm 1982 dollar-sI, about 40 percent less timanm its
$47.6 billion averagevalue in time 1950s. Given time prior
history of farnm inmcomne, time “hoonm” of time 1970s ap-
pears to he best descr-ibed as unusual.
Sonmme tnight argue timat time plot mm chan-t 3 is mislead—
iimg because inmcome is not nmmeasured on a per capita
basis. Because mmmnrmmber-s of far-nmei-s anmd farnmms Imave
been declmnming so rapidly, per capita inconmmeactuallv
imas risen mm recent years! Clearly, it is rmot senmsibie to
itmterpret tIme rising percapita fan-rn inmcome mneasureas
‘Theme are a number ofproblems with tarm population series that lead
toquestions about what per capita measures of farm income mean.
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implying impr’ovenmentsin time weifan-e offar’nmersvis-a-
vis the nt-st of the economy. tf so, we ought to observe
increases irm the number of farnnets r’ather- than wlmat
we actually see. Again, the point goes back to time
mar-gmat product curves in figure 1.Time fact that fan-nm
pn-oductivity is rising while n-esources are leaving the
irmdustny suggests an upward movement along the Mi’,
curve in contn-ast to, say, time conmputer industny,
wimich is making great gaitms in productivity and at—
tracting new r-esoun-ces to the industny. tn fact, the
r-etun-ns to fan-ming still nmust be below the returns to
other occupations — farmers are continuing to ieave
farrmnng for nonfan’mactivities.”
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In liglmtoftime foregoing analysis of iormg-ten-m declin-
ing returns to farming, why were the 1970s a boom
period? Chart 4 shows that time boom period was one
of exceptional capitai gains, not exceptional earnings
from farm production. By dividing total returns to
farming into income and capital gains componenmts,
the ciman’t verifies the earlier- discussion of income
being generally low anmd trending downward. During
agriculture’s boomofthe t97os, imoweven-, capital gains
were positive and, with the exception of 1974, at levels
substantially above the pen-centage return r’epr’esented
by income. For exarmmple, in 1972, when flu’m inconme
produced only a 2.9 percent return on equity, capital
gainms gener-ated a 10.6 percenmt return on equity. By ttme
late 1970s, the shar-e of total returrms pn’odmnced by
capital gains became everm iar-ger-. Income’s simar-e of
time n-eturrm 0mm equity was 1.5 per-cent or less mm eacim
year- betweerm 1976—79, while capital gains, over time
same fouryears, simowed armaver-age retur-n ofabout 9.5
pen-cent. Chart 5 n’einfonces time point by rmoting timat,
with tIme exception of 1972—74, capital gains have r-ep—
resented nearly all of time returns to equity in far-ruing.
The pr’obiem witim usirmg cimanmges in farnm asset val-
ues as a benmcimnmar-k of farm sector pen-Ibrmanmce he—
conmes ciearer when conipar-ing the appreciation of
farm assets with changes irm otimer asset values. Durirmg
“This observation is not new. T. W. Schultz suggested in the 1950s
that government help expedite the flow of farmers to nonfarm work
with a ‘meverse-homesteading” plan. Recognizing already that in-
creasing farm productivitywould make farming unprofitab(e formany
current farmers, but that their transition to nonfarm work might be
impeded by lack ofskills, the notionwas to givefarmers a lump-sum
payment that would allow them toestablishan urban homesteadand
enter nonfarm employment. See 0. G. Johnson (1958), p. 131.
the 1973—80 ‘‘boormm,’’ wimiie time value of fan’nmm assets
r-ose 152 percent, the rmmedman pnice of a sirmgie—fanniiv
home r’ose 115 per-cent, the pr-ice ofgold increased 526
pen-cent and time value of stockholder-s equity in all
manufacturing cor-porations r’ose 79 percenmt. Thus,
while farnm asset values inmcn-eased during time 1970s,
botim absoiutely atmd relative to the prices of sonmme
assets, they dechned relative to prices of otimer assets.
Time point is simply timat, mm an envir-onrmmenmt of high
actual inflationm armd acceieratinmg inflationary expecta—
tions, individuals will make changes iii timeir pon’tfolio
imoldmtmgs totmedge agaitmst rime capital losses associated
with unexpected cimanges irm mnmilatiorm and intent-st
rates. Increases in farrmm asset values, as well as time
values of a wimoie van-ietv of comparabie assets with
varyinmg sets of chan-acter-istics (hqmnidity, use mm conm—
surmmption or prodmrction etc.(, reflected timcse portfo—
ho adjirstnmmenmts. ‘lime data on prnces of farnmm pn’ociucts
Figure 2
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Chart 4
Return to Equity from Income and Real Capital Gains
or farm immconmme, imowever, suggest timat time nismrmg farrn
asset vaiues were not the resuit of imigimer profits fronm
farming per se.
~LTHE FAHM IEJTOH i:H:H:HJULIrNIJ?
tn contn-ast to the tmersistent rmegative tn-ends de-
picted mm time previous sectionm, sormme analysts imave
argued that a lower vaiue for time dollars excimanmge n-ate
would stirmmuiate ftrrnmm exports, raise fan-nmm irmcome and
reven’se the ctechne in farnmm asset values. As nmmentioned
ear-her, timis view is embodied in the phihosopimy of time
1985 Fan’mn Bill and is espoused by sonme farr’n econo-
nmmists. Aitimougim few beheve timat exports will r-eboutmd
to levels of 1980, nmmanmy argue timat timen-e. ar-c signmificanmt
opporturmities to recoup a large slman’e of time $18 billion
mm expor’t sates lost in time last five yean-s.
AL least two pieces of evidence diisagn-ee witim time
prospect of signmificanmriy lan-gen- export sales. ‘i’ime (in-st is
time sharp gairm mm fan’nm pn’oductiorm mm foreign rmations in
r-ecent years. As table I shows, increases in 13.5. pr-o-
cluction ofwheat anmd cotton account for tess tlmarm 10
pen-cent of the irmcrease mm world pn-oductionm between
1980 and 1985; increases in U.S. soybean pntductionm
ar-c about orme—fihiim of time total gairm. Ormly in con-nm
imrodluctiori Imasthe restofthe woridl lagged beimind time
United States.
Timese data support time gener-al commciusion timat, for-
a vanietvof reasons, fort-ign producers have expanded
farnmm output conmsiderably during the 1980s7 With rela-
tively slow gn-owth in world food denimanmd and r-apid
men-eases in time productive capacity of riatiorms timat
former-h’ inmported U.S. food conmmodities, it is diflicuit
to see when-c there is potential to expanmd U.S. farrmm
exports.
‘Reasons often given are the high world price floor set by U.S.
commodity pmogzams during the late 1970s, the view that the U.S.
was an “unreliable” supplier after the 1980 embargo on grain sales
to the Soviet Union and domestic policy decisions in foreign coun-
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Changes in Total and U.S. Production of Major Crops, 1980—85
Increases in Increases in
U.S. production Rate world production Rate
Crop (million tons) of change (million tons) of change
Wheat 60 9.3~ 71 6 iE2~-
Soybeans 1.9 3.8 9.5 11.7
Gotton 0.4 167 .j 3 300
Gore 25.7 ~52 430 106
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Source, Agricultural Outlook. October 1986, p
22
Percent of output
A second reason to doubt any nt-vet-sal in the ionmg-
run decline in the size of the farm sector is the persist-
ence of excess farm capacity in time Unmited States, even
during the ecport boom years. Cimart 6, which depicts
time excess capacity of time U.S.farm sector- as a percent
of total farm output simows timat iong-runm excess ca-
pacity now is near the post-1940 higim of six per-cenmt
that prevaiied dur-ing nmost of time lOGOs.’ Excess capac-
ity for- major crops, rmow at 13 percent, has risen to
levels that existedprion to the export expanisiorm of time
1970s. Witim another signmficanmt export expansion urm-
likely, imowever, it is difficult to see Imow timis excess
capacity wilt be reduced except by a reductionm in the
resources engaged mm farnmming.
A tormger-—runm view of time retevant data of time 1970s
indicates that farrmming fi,rndarmmenmtals — prirmmariy rela-
tive pn-ices and real incormme —‘ have beerm techrmirmg fon-
many year-s. in conmtt-ast, asset values have fluctuated
erratically mm respormse to accelerating iriuiationm, tax
incentives and other factors langehy unr-eiated to the
n-eturns fn-onmm producir’mg and seihrmg farnmm output.
While it is true that fanrmmiarmdl price appr-eciation nmade
nmarmy farrmiets weaitimv prior to 1981, timis weattim in-
crease occurred despite the decline in time prolitabihtv
of farnmirmgitseif.
A shor1 arid selective view of history suggests that
the farnm econonmywas reasonmaimiy imealtimy pnor to time
collapse that began in 1981. Tlmis assessnmenmt is based
on the substantial gains in export volume arid asset
values that went- realized dur-ing time 1970s. Neitimer of
these rmmeasun-es, Imowever, imas much to say about time
inherent past or futurt- profitability of farnninmg.
‘Excess capacity is defined as the difference between potential
supply and commercial demandat prevailing prices. Potential supply
is actual production plus possible production from diverted acres.
See Dvoskin, p. 31.
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